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The New Jury and the Ancient
Jury Conflict
Stephen C. Yeazell
Any lawyer can tell you that jury trial is an ancient monument
of the common law. Some would immediately add that it is a palla-
dium of liberty; others would hasten to say that the jury is the
legal equivalent of the vermiform appendix-at best harmless, at
worst a life-threatening source of infection. I shall argue that the
first statement-about the jury's antiquity-is only trivially accu-
rate; today's jury is a comparatively new legal institution. By con-
trast, the dispute about the jury's virtues is a venerable, persistent,
and defining institution both of the common law and of political
discourse. The dispute is older than the present version of the jury
itself. To speak intelligently about the contemporary jury one must
understand both its novelty and the antiquity of the debate it has
engendered. Understanding these points makes attacking or de-
fending the jury more difficult-because it requires both attackers
and defenders to face up to the values behind their stances.
Groups called "juries" have existed for more than eight centu-
ries, but the institution examined in these pages has been part of
the legal system for fewer than two hundred years, and in some
important respects is less than two decades old. One speaks in
1990 of a body different in fundamental respects from that in 1600,
and different even from that in 1970. I take this relative novelty
(in the glacial world of legal change) to have no bearing on the
desirability of the contemporary civil jury. One can see the civil
jury as an accidental, irrational survivor of a pre-modern world.
With equal plausibility one can view it as a marvelously adaptable
institution that has for almost a millennium democratized law ap-
plication at its most fundamental level. The historical record sup-
ports both views with equal force.
The historical record does speak unequivocally about one
point. The institution of jury trial has proved to be a durable
source of conflict; only the locus of the conflict has changed over
t Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I am grateful for very thoughtful comments
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the centuries. For most of the jury's history the conflict has been
between rulers (who impanel juries to decide cases) and the ruled
(the populations from which juries are drawn). The rulers have
generally lost, as juries have bent law to their beliefs. For the last
two hundred years, however, the struggle has occurred inside gov-
ernment, with Britain and the United States taking different
paths. The British have entrusted plenary power to Parliament,
which operates almost unchecked. Parliament has restricted use of
the British civil jury to a handful of categories, and the institution
has withered away. By contrast, both state and federal govern-
ments in the United States reflect distrust of unchecked power.
The judiciary checks other branches of government. Operating
within the judicial system, the jury checks not only the judiciary
but the other two branches of government as well.
In this setting, jury trial remains a political issue: it places an
unaccountable democratic institution within the least democratic
of the branches of government. Those who, like the contributors to
this forum, debate the jury, ought to do so with a clear eye on the
political character of the institution under discussion. For the jury
is not now and never has been a simple, functional piece of the
judicial machine, to be judged on how well it finds facts. Instead it
plays a complicated role, simultaneously functional and symbolic,
checking judicial power and strengthening judicial institutions, re-
shaping law as it gives a remarkable efficacy to the legal regime.
I. THE NEW JURY
So far as we can tell, the designers of the jury did not attempt
to create a complex political institution. Their failure to anticipate
the possibilities of the institution they created provides an emblem
of the jury's history. At each point in its development, events have
turned intentions from their paths. Medieval kings intended the
jury to enable a thinly stretched bureaucracy to administer an un-
ruly nation; they got instead an institutionalized means of civil dis-
obedience. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century judges sought to
harness what seemed to be inaccurate or irresponsible factfinding.
They failed in that effort, but created the law of evidence, a mon-
ster found in no other legal system. The twentieth-century United
States Supreme Court, seeking to streamline jury trials, has altered
the requirements of size and unanimity; a chorus of social scien-
tists tells us we have created almost laboratory-perfect conditions
for aberrational verdicts.
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A. Origins'
By giving factfinding duties to unsupervised laymen, the medi-
eval jury system brilliantly solved a chronic medieval problem: how
to administer without enough administrators. 2 Although not con-
fined to law, the problem was particularly acute in law because it
required people who were both literate and highly trained.3 Train-
ing more people was part of the problem; paying them was an even
greater one for the perpetually strained English royal purse. More-
over, in the centuries immediately following the Conquest, judges
not only had to apply the law but also largely to create it. Though
they managed to create the law, they could not without assistance
apply that law.
Then, as now, law is relatively cheap; facts are expensive. A
legal rule by its nature applies to many situations. In each of those
situations someone must determine whether the events that would
trigger the legal rule have occurred. To describe the jury as if its
only task was to determine the existence of a single historical fact
considerably oversimplifies-even in a regime of the strictest com-
mon law pleading. Medieval, like modern, juries often had to de-
cide which of competing, overlapping factual contentions best fit
their sense of the situation." If the royal officials who made the law
had been forced in each instance also to find the facts (even simple
The account of the pre-modern jury contained in this section does not purport to
contain original historical research. It may nevertheless be worth reciting because some of
those who debate the contemporary jury seem to ignore the constant evolution of this an-
cient institution.
I This account closely follows that of Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to
Conscience: Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial Jury, 1200-1800 (University of Chi-
cago Press, 1985). As Green's title suggests, his focus is criminal law. But the motivations
behind the extension of civil jurisdiction-and with it the jury inquest-were milder ver-
sions of the policy underlying criminal enforcement. The Crown had a duty to keep peace
among its subjects; that task included dispensing justice between subject and subject. In a
world in which criminal prosecutions were brought by private parties, the line between civil
and criminal law was not so sharp as we now see it. The great civil writs grew from trespass,
which connoted a crime-breach of the king's peace-as well as what we would now call a
tort.
3 "The substitution for the feudal barons of professional officials for the judicial work
of the old curia was a common phenomenon in Europe in the later Middle Ages; in England
it took place at a very early date and the ablest men in the realm were thought just good
enough for the task, many of them highly educated clerics." R.C. van Caenegem, Royal
Writs in England from the Conquest to Glanvill30 (Selden Society, v 77 1959) ("Royal
Writs").
' As the grip of single-issue pleading loosened, juries received even more complex tasks.
They must often decide, first, which facts in a constellation appear most prominent and
then apply the law to the salient constellation: for example, is this a lie (fraud) or a broken
promise (contract)?
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facts), the system would have died in its infancy. No medieval Eu-
ropean government was capable of bearing that weight, though
contemporary political theory said that a good monarch would ad-
minister justice to his people. Accordingly, each system had to find
ways of shedding the obligation without admitting that it was fail-
ing in a central task of government.
The English solved the problem with institutions that did not,
for the most part, require royal officials to find facts. The jury sys-
tem fit this specification in two respects. It forced on the lay popu-
lation the task of saying what was so and not so, whether John had
with force and arms wounded Ralph; whether the Prioress had
wrongfully ejected Henry, her tenant. Such findings not only
spared the judges the task of hearing witnesses, sifting kernels of
fact from the chaff of mutual perjury, and reconstructing events.
Using a jury also shifted to a local institution the unpleasant task
of delivering bad news to one of the parties to the lawsuit. The
loser's neighbors, not the judge, caused his unhappiness. The medi-
eval jury thus represented an effort by rulers to require the gov-
erned population to perform an often difficult and unwelcome task
of government.
The procedure attending medieval jury trial testifies to its
roots in official desperation. It is a well-known circumstance that
medieval jurors were witnesses as much as factfinders. Less often
stressed is a byproduct of this role: such a procedure saved much
judicial time.5 Summoned, at least in theory, from the hundred6 in
which the suit arose, the jurors were asked to say the truth of the
matter between the parties. For example, a court in 1188 asked an
assize jury:
whether Peter, the father of Peter of Oakerthorpe, was
seised in demesne as of fee of 25 acres of land near the
church of South Wingfield on the day of his death and
whether he died after the first coronation of the lord king
and whether the said Peter was his nearest heir.7
John Dawson's study is one that does emphasize this aspect of the institution:
"[c]rude and clumsy as it was, the early common law jury wasan essential means of con-
serving trained manpower in a government that had taken on new tasks of immense scope
and complexity." John P. Dawson, A History of Lay Judges 128 (Harvard University Press,
1960).
' The "hundred" was an administrative subdivision of the county or shire; each hun-
dred had its own court.
' Royal Writs at 92 (cited in note 3).
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The assemblages to which these questions were put were sup-
posed to know the answers to the court's inquiries. The jurors were
to be selected for their knowledge of the underlying events; if they
were ignorant, the solution was not to present evidence, but to se-
lect more jurors until one found those who knew.8 Jurors who were
not sure often made inquiries of those outside the jury who were
thought to know.9 The common denominator in these practices is
that they required little time of counsel and none of the judiciary;
once properly summoned, the jurors bore the weight of whatever
factual investigation they chose to conduct. Moreover, because the
jury did not have to rest its finding on evidence presented in open
court, one could not assail gaps in.the evidence or weaknesses in
the inferences necessary to support a verdict. 10 So long as the jury
had not found a logically impossible "fact," one could assume that
knowledge or investigation had led to the inference contained 'in
the verdict.1" This arrangement left the small judiciary to do the
work for which it was trained: creating the law.
At the same time' however, this delegation created an unin-
tended area of jury power. Left in control of the facts, the medie-
val jury could "find" those facts in ways that reshaped or chal-
lenged the formal legal regime. Thomas Green's account of the
medieval jury demonstrates that juries persistently foughtthe rig-
orous definition of felony homicide, acquitting many of murder
who appear to have been guilty of that offense as defined in law."
That law offended juries' sense of justice. Over centuries, that com-
munal sense of justice prevailed. The formal law recognized de-
grees of homicide, and the regime of capital punishment relaxed.
The substantive law bent under the pressure of the communal
sense of right and wrong. Substantive legal change had resulted
from an administrative delegation compelled by necessity.
' Id at .90.
Id at 93.
10 "The lack of concern with the source of the jury's information is perhaps indicative
of the jury's origin as a royal instrument of power, used to further the Crown's interests
while maintaining a procedural facade of justice." John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-
Witness to Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32 Am J Legal
Hist 201, 204 (1988).
" One sees this proposition at work in the sole means of attacking a medieval jury
verdict-through attaint. In attaint, one accused the jurors of perjuring themselves by, ren-
dering an erroneous verdict. Id at 203. Logically, that position made sense: if the jurors were
witnesses/investigators who "knew" the truth, then it followed that an inaccurate verdict
could occur only if they lied.
1" Green, Verdict According to Conscience'at 28-64 (cited in note 2).
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The jury was not the only solution to the shortage of adminis-
trators. In what we would now call civil actions, the jury competed
with other procedures, the most common of which was compurga-
tion (oath-taking).3 Modern observers draw a sharp contrast be-
tween the reliability and empirical orientation of the jury verdict
and the introspective and perjury-prone system of oath-taking.
Seen from the perspective suggested here, however, similarities
override contrasts. First, both compurgation and the jury inquest
relieved the judge of fact-finding duties. Second, both procedures
produced virtually opaque statements, relieving the courts of the
task of dissecting factual analyses for consistency and reliability.
From this standpoint, compurgation and the jury were equally sat-
isfactory solutions to the problem of royal understaffing. Only in a
world with greater surpluses was it possible to indulge in the lux-
ury of wondering which system produced better, "truer"
judgments.
B. The Eighteenth-Century Transformation
The late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw that more
luxurious world. In it the jury underwent a basic change. Jurors
ceased to be witnesses, functioning instead as fact-finders, assem-
bled on the basis of their ignorance rather than of their knowledge.
No longer did they investigate."4 In this early modern period the
jurors began to hear evidence presented in open court and gov-
erned by an elaborate set of rules about its presentation. Because
their verdict could rest only on such evidence, one could conclude
that in some subset of jury cases the jury had reached an irrational
verdict. When that happened, judges began to set verdicts aside
and to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict or order a new
trial. All of these developments-the demise of the juror-witness,
the restriction of the flow of evidence to open court, and the power
of the judge to set aside or reverse a civil jury verdict-made the
"3 Compurgation, available in some common law actions (debt was the most notorious),
permitted a defendant to avoid liability by appearing with a sufficient number of oath-help-
ers who swore, without testifying to the underlying events or submitting to cross-examina-
tion, that the defendant was not liable. Perhaps once a reasonable test of local reputation
for credibility when claims were tried in county courts, compurgation became a joke when
trials occurred in London and oath-helpers could be recruited for the price of a drink. Sir
Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, 2 The History of English Law Before the
Time of Edward 1 634-37 (Cambridge University Press, 2d ed 1899).
" We have come so far from the medieval model that today independent investiga-
tion-even when well-intentioned-is grounds for setting aside the resulting verdict. See In
re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F2d 207, 214 (6th Cir 1982).
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early modern jury a fundamentally different institution from its
medieval parent. Combined, these changes altered the relation-
ships of power among the three institutions of civil -jury tri-
als-judge, counsel and jury. 5
1. Evidence and Translucency.
By the late middle ages, the entirely self-informing jury had
become rare. Courts and litigants expected jurors to base their ver-
dicts on evidence presented in court though rules did not explicitly
reflect these expectations."6 In the latter seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries, legal rules caught up with these practices and
made the self-informing jury not just rare- but illegal. Recent work
by John Mitnick 17 has carefully traced two linked developments in
the relationship between judge and civil juror in the 150 years
before 1800. First, the granting of new trials replaced attaint 8 as
the remedy for an erroneous verdict. 9 Second, judges developed
the rule that evidence on which the jury based its verdict must
have been received in open court; the jury could no longer "know"
things not presented at trial.2 Together these two changes meant
that trials as we know them today-competing efforts to demon-
strate factual propositions in support of legally sufficient ac-
The preceding paragraph summarizes a set of changes that happened over more than
a century and a half, with some of them not crystallizing into well-established rules until the
end of the nineteenth century. All of them were well in motion by 1800.
1" "By the fourteenth century the collective, judicial character of the jury was obviously
going to prevail. Although jurors were allowed, even encouraged, to inform themselves
before the trial, it became an irregularity to communicate with them once they were sworn
other than by giving evidence in open court .... So far was the judicial theory of jury trial
carried that by the mid-sixteenth century it was irregular even for jurors to inform each
other of facts without giving evidence in open court:" John Hamilton Baker, An Introduc-
tion to English Legal History 65-66 (Butterworth, 2d ed 1979) ("Introduction").
17 Mitnick, 32 Am J Legal Hist at 212, 223 (cited in note 10).
"8 Formally, attaint was not an appeal but an indictment of the original jury for perjury
for failing to speak truly about the facts of the case. See note 11. If effective, it overturned
the verdict and convicted the original jury of a crime. William S. Holdsworth, 1 A History of
English Law 337-42 (Little, Brown & Co., 1931). As one might expect, attaint juries were
extremely reluctant to convict their neighbors in such circumstances, and the attaint was
acknowledged even in medieval times to be a failure as a system for controlling trial juries.
" As Mitnick points out, attaint remained as an available remedy for wrong verdicts
until 6 George IV ch 50 § 60 abolished it in 1825, but no rational litigant would invoke its
tortuous and usually ineffective processes when a new trial was available as a remedy. Mit-
nick, 32 Am J Legal Hist at 211 (cited in note 10).
'0 Bushell's Case, 124 Eng Rep 1006, 1012-13 (CP 1670), held that jury nullification was
permissible, resting on the contrary proposition-that jurors were supposed to possess per-
sonal knowledge of the events in question sufficient to permit them to acquit in the face of
the evideace. But the holding in Bushell's Case was limited to criminal trials, and did not
impede the granting of new trials in civil litigation. Id at 1013-14.
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counts-emerged. As the modern trial developed, two new charac-
teristics of litigation accompanied it-the law of evidence and the
translucent judgment.
Once judges determined that juries had to base their findings
on in-court presentations, courts needed rules to govern those
presentations." A law of evidence resulted. The matter was partly
one of convenience and fairness: parties ought not be able to sink a
case simply by going on until the other side drops of exhaustion.
But it involved a substantive principle as well; with the demise of
the writs,22 rules of relevance guarded the substantive law. If, for
example, inability to pay was not a defense to breach of contract,
then one way of assuring that a judgment would not be based on
this "tainted" defense was to insist that it not be heard in the trial
arena. Once party presentation rather than jury investigation and
knowledge became the basis for verdicts, courts had either to treat
substantive law as merely hortatory or to invent principles to pro-
tect it. By taking the latter path, courts created the law of evi-
dence. The law of evidence was largely an eighteenth-century
growth.2" By the nineteenth century that growth had become suffi-
ciently luxuriant to draw an attack by Jeremy Bentham.24
Courtroom presentation governed by evidentiary rules also
rendered verdicts translucent25-though not entirely transparent. 2
21 Though certainly useful, such rules were not logically necessary. We are all familiar
with party-dominated presentations in which the only limiting factor is the time allotted to
each side's presentation: formal debates and legislative proceedings are two common in-
stances. In such situations the parties are permitted to present anything they think persua-
sive. The differences between these processes and the judicial trial are telling. We hold trials
to a higher standard of rationality than debates: hence the law of evidence.
22 The writs-the medieval forms of action-involved both what we would now call
substantive law and what we would call procedure. Many of the writs carried with them
what one can anachronistically call their own rules of evidence. For example, in the writ of
novel disseisin, the question was whether, within a stated time period, a freeholder had been
unjustly (that is, without a judicial action) deprived of seisin. See Royal Writs at 261-67
(cited in note 3). In debt, the question was whether the appropriate number of oath-helpers
would swear the debt was not owed.
23 Blackstone remarks on it only in passing, referring readers to a then-recently pub-
lished treatise by Baron Gilbert. 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of Eng-
land *367, note n (1768; reprinted by University of Chicago Press, 1979) ("Commentaries").
24 Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Judicial Evidence (Hunt and Clarke, 1827).
" Calabresi and Bobbitt have invoked the opposite metaphor, arguing that juries are
"black boxes" into which we put questions without answers that we are prepared to defend
publicly. Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices 57-64 (W.W. Norton & Co.,
1978). But the starting point of their argument supports my point: in modern trials, civil
juries get only cases that are capable of being rationally decided for either party. To say
that there are borderline cases in which no system of decision can yield results capable of
rigorously rational defense is not to say that all decisions are irrational.
26 Transparency-complete visibility of the links between evidence and infer-
ence-would require the jury analogue of judicial findings, the special verdict.
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With a record,2 7 an appellate court could decide whether the evi-
dence supported the verdict. Even without a record (which was
still rare in the eighteenth century), the judge presiding at trial
could make such a decision. Retrospective analysis and second-
guessing became possible. Trials in consequence became attempted
empirical demonstrations rather than soundings of local feelings
and beliefs.28
2. Changed Relationships: Lawyers, Judges and Jurors.
Several consequences flow from the regulated presentation of
evidence in open proceedings. The first is longer trials. The in-
creased length of trials is commonly linked to the regulation of evi-
dentiary presentation in open proceedings. Rules regulating the
presentation of proof flowered, often shaped by fear that the jury
was likely to draw false conclusions from certain types of evidence.
Demonstrations conducted according to these rules of evidence
took longer. Trials therefore lasted longer because the jury had to
"learn" rather than to declare the facts.
Trials not only took longer; they displayed different relation-
ships of institutional power. The law of evidence, combined with
what I have referred to as the principle of translucency, produced
these changes. When the jury could no longer know in advance
what was true or investigate on its own, the parties had to assume
responsibility for demonstrating their versions of truth. Experts
rather than laypersons exerted more control over the proceedings.
Such rival presentations increased the length of trials. Rules of evi-
dence have a symbiotic relationship with the use of trial counsel.
Only counsel could handle complex evidentiary rules, and complex
evidentiary rules could emerge only as counsel became more com-
mon. When factual investigation moved from the hands of an inde-
pendent lay agency to those of partisan experts, parties had more
control over proceedings, and used that opportunity to present
27 A history of trial records would be an important contribution to our understanding of
the developing rationalism of the modern trial.
28 1 do not mean to suggest that medieval jury verdicts depended entirely on which
party was the most fearsome or the most popular-though accounts suggest that both fac-
tors affected results. Facts mattered then as now. The point is rather that modern trials
subject facts to considerably more scrutiny than is customary in everyday life-or was nec-
essary in the closed confines of medieval jury deliberation. In both situations people can
"know" things that may not withstand sustained rational scrutiny.
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competing versions of the facts. Translucent trials thus gave the
adversary system a new shape, and a longer length.2 9
Finally, translucency and the growth of a law of evidence gave
new responsibility to judges. In the medieval world, once the skir-
mishing over pleading had ended, the judges could hand the case
to the trial jury, which would render a verdict impervious except to
attaint. In the regime that emerged in the eighteenth century, the
judge had a much more active role after the pleadings closed. As
lawyers' presentations became more elaborate, judges had to con-
trol those presentations by ruling on whether evidence might be
admitted. Judges thus began to exert more control both over the
lawyers and over the verdicts resulting from the evidence
presented by lawyers. Because the jury's verdict had to be based
on that presentation, the judge could abort the trial (by entering a
nonsuit)3 0 or by ordering a new trial. Judges could take these ac-
tions because they had rules for controlling the flow of evidence
and the new ability to compare the verdict to the facts offered to
sustain it. Only in the middle of the eighteenth century did it be-
come absolutely clear that a trial court could control jury "miscon-
duct" by granting a new trial.31 A product of the "new" jury trial,
this remedy itself created longer trials: counsel seeking to assure
themselves against this catastrophe would increase the quantum of
evidence presented. Paradoxically, the possession of one instru-
ment of control-grant of new trial-may have made judges eager
to avoid the time-wasting necessity for its use by relying heavily on
another-commenting on evidence to urge juries to render a ver-
dict that agreed with the judge's view of the facts. Translucency,
produced by an uninformed jury and the law of evidence, thus
made verdicts subject to challenge, and required judges to rule on
those challenges.
These transformations were not instantaneous. As John
Langbein has taught us,32 seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
criminal .jury trials were by modern standards astonishingly rapid
" Paradoxically, these longer trials became simultaneously more open to reversal, as
the preceding section suggested. When the basis of the jury's decision was laid bare, it was
always possible that a judge-prodded by opposing counsel-would discover some logically
necessary piece of evidence was missing.
"o The nonsuit or demurrer to the evidence functioned as the directed verdict, a mod-
ern term, does today. Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment,
80 Harv L Rev 289, 300-305(1966).
" Mitnick, 32 Am J Legal Hist at 212-16 (cited in note 10).
" John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U Chi L Rev 263
(1978); John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from
the Ryder Sources, 50 U Chi L Rev 1 (1983).
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affairs: "At [Lord Chief Justice] Ryder's first Old Bailey sessions in
October 1754, for example, he presided over sixteen trials by two
juries in three days."'33 A similar situation prevailed, in colonial
Massachusetts.34 Langbein traces much of this rapidity to the use
of experienced juries and to the absence of lawyers, who were still
not common in criminal cases. Once seated, juries would try a
number of cases, often hearing several before they were asked to
render verdicts in any. What they heard was adversarial-the par-
ties had different versions of the facts-but, in criminal cases,
often unguided by lawyers. In civil actions, where counsel had al-
ways been more prominent, the changes came earlier.
The combination of these circumstances-the demise of the
juror-witness, the attendant necessity for the presentation of proof
at trial, the concomitant growth of the law of evidence and the
incidence of judicial control and supervision, and the beginning of
the increased duration of trial-made a civil jury trial at the end of
the eighteenth century a markedly different affair from that in
1600, a difference disguised by the circumstance that one could
trace the roots of the institution to the ambitious reforms of a me-
dieval king. These eighteenth-century changes involved changed
relationships among the participants-the parties, the court and
counsel. Jurors now depended on counsel for the information on
which they based a verdict. Counsel depended on judges for evi-
dentiary rulings and for decisions on whether the evidence offered
was sufficient to sustain a verdict. Both the necessity to hear evi-
dence and the more complex traffic rules regulating that evidence
made trials take longer-and made more likely the necessity for a
second trial to correct errors in the first.
C. The Modern Transformation
The institution of the jury did not remain static between 1800
and the present day. The last two decades in particular, however,
have seen a constellation of changes; together they have worked
another, if somewhat lesser, transformation in the nature of the
institution that continues to go under the old name. These
13 Id at 115.
34'.'Litigation was certainly more peremptory than it is today; the Minute Books show
that the Superior Court would dispose of as many as six jury trials (using only two twelve-
man juries) in a single day, and the [Boston] Massacre Trials ... were said to have been the
first criminal matters to require more than one day for trial in the history of Massachu-
setts." Wroth and Zobel, eds, 1 The Legal Papers of John Adams at xlviii to xlix (Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1965).
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changes-in size, composition, and unanimity require-
ments-affected not the relation between judge and jury but the
jury's internal structure and functioning, aspects untouched by the
eighteenth-century changes. Between 1600 and 1950, the jury re-
mained essentially stable in size."5 It also made no pretense to de-
mographic cross-sectionality: Sheriffs were supposed to summon
the "right sort" of jurors, and would have been appalled at the
suggestion that they ought to seek out a broad cross-section of the
population. Moreover, the jury's internal decisional rule required
unanimity.3 6 Thus a sixteenth-century jury might base a verdict on
jurors' own knowledge, but it had to convince all its members. By
the nineteenth century, the verdict had to be based on the evi-
dence presented in court, but the same rule of unanimity pre-
vailed: all twelve jurors had to concur. These requirements have
undergone significant change in the United States in the past
twenty years. The result is an institution with internal dynamics
different from those of earlier juries; those dynamics, in turn, may
produce different verdicts in some cases.
1. Size and Composition.
The reduction in jury size had simple and laudable motives:
saving of time and juror inconvenience. Not only did the eight-
eenth century changes produce longer trials; they also made the
process of selecting juries take longer. Once the juror informed
about the case became a thing to be feared rather than desired, it
became necessary to screen jurors for now-forbidden knowledge
about the dispute. Voir dire, originally a simple charge to speak
s Medieval juries had varied a good deal, though twelve was thought to be the mini-
mum size. By the early modern period, however, twelve had become the standard jury size.
See John Langbein, The English Criminal Jury on the Eve of the French Revolution, in
The Trial Jury in England, France, and Germany 1700-1900 13, 27 (Duncker & Humblot,
1987). The American colonies made occasional exceptions to this practice, perhaps because
in a more thinly populated land it was more difficult to find twelve jurors. As Colgrove v
Battin, 413 US 149, 158 n 12 (1973), noted, "juries of less than 12 were commonplace in this
country throughout colonial times." That may overstate things. The Colgrove Court's only
citation for its assertion was H. Richmond Fisher, The Seventh Amendment and the Com-
mon Law: No Magic in Numbers, 56 FRD 507, 529-32 (1973). Fisher cites seven instances of
use of a jury of other than 12, some being larger rather than smaller; in some of these
instances the jury was trying small claims. The Supreme Court, which otherwise relies on
English precedents in its Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, somewhat unusually cited this
small sample of colonial American experience in approving a six-person civil jury.
"' "[Allthough traces are found until 1346 of the earlier view that the judges were to
umpire any disagreements, the vast majority of verdicts in the rolls were the unqualified
verdicts of twelve. A leading case of 1367 put the matter beyond doubt; rejecting earlier
precedents, the court held a majority verdict to be void." Baker, Introduction at 66 (cited in
note 16).
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truly concerning what one knew, became an inquiry into degrees of
knowledge and predisposing attitudes. It takes time to conduct
such inquiries, a good deal of time if lawyers do so themselves,
combining such inquiry with an introduction to their view of the
case. Picking a twelve-person jury (and perhaps alternates) thus
takes longer than picking a jury of smaller size; smaller juries may
also take less time to reach a verdict. Moreover, if one imposes a
low threshold for discharging a juror, selecting a jury of any given
size. will require the attendance of substantially more citizens than
will eventually serve-a significant inconvenience.
Our era's response to these administrative problems has been
to reduce the required size of the jury. In 1973, the United States
Supreme Court concluded, in Colgrove v Battin37 that the use of a
six-person civil jury violated neither the Seventh Amendment to
the federal Constitution,38 nor the Rules Enabling Act,39 nor the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ° The constitutional holding es-
sentially ratified what was already a widespread practice in the
federal courts. According to a footnote in the opinion, fifty-four
federal district courts had already adopted local rules that man-
dated six-member juries in some or all civil cases. A number of
states have followed suit."'
This trend toward smaller juries in the name of efficiency col-
lided with a conflicting social policy requiring juries to reflect de-
mography more accurately. In the not-far-distant past, women, ra-
cial minorities, the working class and others had been routinely
omitted from juries. Many of the practices that resulted in this
exclusion are now unlawful.' 2 As court administrators were reduc-
ing jury size, legislatures were requiring that jury selection
" 413 US 149 (1973).
31 Id at 159-60.
', Id at 162-63. Petitioner argued that the Act, 28 USC § 2072, which then provided
that the rules of procedure should not abridge the right to trial by ju.ry, bolstered the consti-
tutional provision. Id at 161.
," Id at 163-64. Petitioner argued that FRCP 48, which provides that the parties may
stipulate to a jury of fewer than 12, implied that absent such stipulation, a court must
empanel a twelve-member jury. Id at 163.
41 Id at 150 n 1. New York, for example, provides for six-member juries in all civil
cases. NY CPLR § 4104 (McKinney 1975 & Supp 1990).
See, for example, Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522 (1975) (holding unconstitutional
the exclusion from juries of non-volunteer women); Thiel v Southern Pacific Co., 328 US
217 (1946) (exercising the Court's supervisory power to hold improper the exclusion of daily-
wage workers from jury selection lists); 28 USC §§ 1863-74 (1988); NY Judiciary Law § 500
(McKinney 1975 & Supp 1990) ("It is the policy of this state that all litigants. . . shall have
the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the com-
munity ....").
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processes achieve broad cross-sectionality."I Such requirements re-
flect a cautious opening of the political classes to include women,
ethnic minorities and the poor. They also reflect the difficulty of
filling jury pools in a multi-racial society if one limits the venire to
the white, male and middle class.
Without anyone's apparently intending it, these two
changes-reduced size and increased demographic representative-
ness-conflicted with each other. Decreasing the size of a jury
reduces the likelihood that any given social characteristic will be
reflected in the jury's members." The average jury will not change,
but the rate of variation among actual juries will. In Ballew v
Georgia, the Supreme Court belatedly acknowledged the validity
of this statistical critique, stopping the reduction in jury size at six,
but not requiring a movement back to twelve.45 The point for our
purposes, however, is not the desirability of the smaller jury, but
the change represented by acceptance of that smaller jury.
2. Deliberative Structure: Unanimity.
The second modern change in jury procedure further reduces
the situations in which the "old" dynamics will prevail. As juries
were shrinking, many jurisdictions were eliminating the require-
ment that their verdicts be unanimous. 46 The laudable motivations
were again increased speed and decreased cost. Hung juries require
retrials, and trial time is very expensive both for the parties and
for the judiciary; courtrooms are scarce, and lawyers expensive.
One solution lies in changing the decisional rules for juries: abol-
See, for example, 28 USC § 1861 (1988): "It is the policy of the United States that all
litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to ... juries selected
at random from a fair cross section of the community ...."; Cal Civ Proc Code §§ 197
(West 1990) ("All persons selected for jury service shall be selected at random, from a
source or sources inclusive of a representative cross section of the population of the area
served by the court."); Or Rev Stat § 10.030 (1989) ("[O]pportunity for jury service shall not
be denied or limited on the basis of race, national origin, gender, age, religious belief, in-
come, occupation, or any other factor that discriminates against a cognizable group ....").
" See Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 171 (Plenum Press, 1978):
"[Tihere was a considerable body of literature on the differences between six- and twelve-
person juries. Most of the literature supported the arguments of early critics that smaller
juries provided poorer representation of community viewpoints."
" Ballew v Georgia, 435 US 223 (1978).
46 See, for example, Mich Comp Laws Ann §§ 600.1352, 600.1304 (West 1981 & Supp
1989) (expanding jury pool by requiring use of driver's licence and identification lists; simul-
taneously providing for a verdict of five of six civil jurors); Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 4501, 5104
(Purdon 1981) (requiring broad demographic representation on juries; providing for verdict
by five-sixths of civil jury).
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ishing unanimity in favor of some super-majority. For every' jury
in which most but not all of the members agree on a verdict, the
potential cost of a new trial will be saved.
This change in decisional rules has two effects. The first is to
award victory to an uncertain percentage of parties who, had the
jury hung, would have had to choose between a new trial and set-
tling for whatever the other party would offer. Evaluations of this
result will differ. One might believe that the majorities are likely to
have the correct view of the case.'8 In that case, lopping off the
holdouts will be but an unobjectionable shortcut to the foreor-
dained result of a second trial. Or one might believe that signifi-
cant if aberrant viewpoints are valuable parts of the jury process,
in which case the result will seem regrettable.
A second change possibly achieved by the movement to the
non-unanimous jury may be invisible in the verdict. Experiments
suggest that juries required to reach unanimous verdicts do so by
discussing the evidence in detail, sorting through it and using it as
a way of persuading colleagues. By contrast, juries in which other
decisional rules prevail discuss not the evidence, but the verdict
itself, debating the justice of the consequences perceived to flow
from one rather than another verdict.' 9 Given the state of the em-
pirical studies and the absence of any strong intuitive support for
the claimed difference, one should be cautious about drawing any
strong conclusions. But, to the extent that differences exist, one
can reasonably prefer either pattern. If one views the jury primar-
ily as a factfinding machine, focus on the evidence is the aim, and
any movement away from that focus is regrettable. But if one
thinks of the jury as a reflector of community sentiment, increased
discussion of the verdict would be a desirable change. Whatever
one's normative stance, however, the point for the present is that
the changes in jury process in the past few decades have produced
both a different internal dynamic and a number of different ver-
dicts than would have been the case under previous regimes. The
In fact, not quite every: some cases will settle before retrial because the party against
whom the majority on the hung jury was aligned will decide that dodging one bullet is
enough.
11 One study gives modest support to this belief. "We cannot conclude that the two jury
types differ in the consistency. with which they arrive at verdicts. The various measures of
accuracy (recall scores, amount of discussion, etc.) suggest that if either jury performs with
greater accuracy, it is the quorum jury." Michael J. Saks, Jury Verdicts: The Role of Group
Size and Social Decision Rules 96-98 (Lexington Books, 1977).
" Hans & Vidmar, Judging the Jury at 174-75 (cited in note 44).
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jury in 1990 is an institution with characteristics significantly dif-
ferent from those it possessed in 1970.
3. Actual and Hypothetical Change.
Yet the offsetting combination of these changes may have in
part prevented even greater alterations in the civil jury.50 Describ-
ing these imagined changes is tricky. One must distinguish be-
tween hypothetical and historical circumstances involving three
variables: size, composition, and rule of decision. The base line is
the "old" jury-twelve persons (usually male, white and middle
class) required to reach a unanimous verdict. The greatest hypo-
thetical change would have involved a jury of the same size and
rule of decision, but opened to a broader part of the population.
But in courts (like the federal system) that shrank jury size as
they expanded representation, the two changes offset each other:
smaller juries are less likely to contain a member possessing any
given characteristic. So the impossible task facing one who would
describe changes involves comparing the demographic characteris-
tics of a twelve-person jury before the opening of the social gates
with a six-person jury after the broadening of jury selection
processes. I am unprepared to hazard that comparison. One can
say with confidence only that smaller juries have greater inter-jury
demographic variation than those they would have possessed had
the size remained at twelve.
One is on slightly surer ground in arguing that reducing group
size increases the number of aberrant verdicts. This consequence
flows from a statistical commonplace, the small sample error. If a
given population holds a particular view, reducing the size of the
sample used as a proxy for the population makes it more likely
that the smaller group will hold a view unrepresentative of the
larger group. Thus if a representative sample of a locale would
view the facts presented at trial in one way, halving the size of the
group (here the jury) increases the chances that it will hold an ab-
errant view. 1 This proposition does not, of course, depend on one's
" Indeed, such greater changes may in fact be occurring in those states that have held
to the larger jury and still require unanimity, but which have adopted broader principles of
demographic representation. Because most courts still prohibit the recording of jury deliber-
ation or the use of control juries, empirical research on jury decisions and decisional
processes is puny. Hans & Vidmar review its current state. Id.
" One theoretical and empirical study of juries concluded, "[liarge juries were more
reliable in that they were more consistent in their choice of verdict." Saks, Jury Verdicts at
86 (cited in note 48).
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belief that the more representative group is correct;5' one need
only say that it is average, and that smaller groups will produce
larger deviations from the average. On any given evidence, then,
smaller juries will produce more anomalous defendant's verdicts at
the same time as they produce more jackpot-figure punitive dam-
age awards. One cannot say for any given jury which is more likely;
one can say that both outlying results are more likely in the
aggregate.
Some have also argued that reducing jury size changes the
jury's propensity to come to no decision at all, contending that six-
person juries will deadlock less often than twelve-person juries .5
Resting on premises about group behavior, this observation sug-
gests hold-outs are more likely when they have some initial sup-
port from other members who share their minority view. Because
of the formidable difficulties of designing a study that would iso-
late this question, 5 no well founded empirical evidence supports
this proposition. 6 Nor is there any to refute it.5 7 What one can say,
again, is that changes in unanimity rules make the point moot: a
jury that does not need to come to a unanimous decision will not
be affected by a single holdout.
II. THE ANCIENT CONFLICT
As the jury has changed, however, one characteristic has per-
sisted: its position as a focus for conflict among ideas about law
and government. Part of that conflict appears in clashes between
judge and jury, between law and sentiment. Another part of the
conflict appears as a broader political question concerning the de-
sign of government and the popular trust of governmental
authority.
A. The Social Conflict: Lay and Professional Justice
The conflict that emerged at the birth of the-jury has proved
durable-that between juries as mirrors of popular (or at least lay)
values and judges as representatives of a professional elite. At
Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 Yale L J 100 (1968).
" Hans Zeisel .... And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury,
38 U Chi L Rev 710, 716-18 (1971).
" Id at 719-20.
51 See the discussion in Saks, Jury Verdicts at 54-59 (cited in note 48).
6 Id at 87.
"Deadlocking in juries is a rather low frequency event, and ... it would take a larger
sample size to reliably detect it." Id at 89.
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stake was how law created by judges and lawyers would be applied
in practice. In the Middle Ages, the law and practice of murder
provided the arena of struggle;58 today the most contested arena
may well involve civil disputes. No sharply delineated struggle oc-
curred in medieval actions of the sort we would now label civil, in
part because there never seems to have been such a systematic
conflict between lay and professional rules. But one cannot doubt
that community sentiment, sometimes admirable, sometimes paro-
chial or craven, shaped civil verdicts. What humanly caused harms
would be held to be unavoidable accidents rather than trespasses?
How many strangers with good title would be permitted to eject
popular local occupiers? How many powerful and fearsome liti-
gants would win verdicts despite the letter of the law?
One well-documented instance of such a clash between com-
munity views and strict legal requirements occurred in the early
American republic. The Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution grew, in part, out of sharp inflation followed by the
prospect of deflation. e In the inflation attending and following the
revolutionary war, many, especially farmers, had borrowed money
of an ever-decreasing value. Much of the debt had taken the form
of state-issued notes. Had the inflation continued, they would have
been able to repay their debts with cheap currency. The ratifica-
tion of the Constitution threatened to change the balance dramati-
cally in -favor of creditors. The new federal government was to be
permitted, and states forbidden, to coin money, and the new gov-
ernment was to assume the debts of the old. These provisions indi-
cated that the new government took credit seriously, and intended
to pursue a policy that would retain the confidence of prospective
creditors. These developments suggested that debts incurred with
the prospect of cheap money would have to be expensively repaid.
The characteristics of the creditor and debtor classes made
things worse. Some debt was local, but a good deal was owed either
to regional financial centers or to foreign creditors, chiefly British.
That meant that suits to collect debts regularly pitted Boston and
Charleston bankers against inland farmers, British lenders against
American borrowers. No one was prepared to argue in principle
that these debts ought simply to be repudiated, probably because
88 See text accompanying note 12.
, My account here follows the rendering in Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 Minn L Rev 639 (1973). Compare Henderson, 80
Harv L Rev 289 (arguing that the role of jury trial was less central in ratification debates)
(cited in note 30).
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lenders were sufficiently dispersed to make that an unpopular ar-
gument in many quarters. But much of the anti-Federalist argu-
ment against ratifying the Constitution focused on the absence of
an explicit provision for jury trial, linking that institution to the
welfare of debtors.6 0 Their argument clearly drew the lines between
professional and lay perceptions of law; as Wolfram points out, the
anti-Federalists arguing for the jury were under no illusions that
jury trials were faster or cheaper than bench trials:
[I]nconveniences [were] accepted precisely because, in
important instances, through its ability to disregard sub-
stantive rules of law, the jury would reach a result that
the judge either could not or would not reach. Those who
favored the civil jury were not misguided tinkerers . . .
they were, for the day, libertarians who avowed that im-
portant areas of protection for litigants . . . would be
placed in grave danger unless it were required that juries
sit in civil cases.8'
Though creditor-debtor conflict no longer has the same politi-
cal valence it possessed in late eighteenth-century America, numer-
ous cases present similar conflicts between the formal legal regime
and popular notions of justice. Some would say that awards against
deep-pocket defendants represent either a generalized casualness
about inflicting damage awards on such entities or, perhaps, an ef-
fort to achieve, via the tort system, some of the goals that might be
achieved through social insurance in other cultures. Though con-
texts shift, the jury remains a potentially volatile voice of popular
sentiment that occasionally clashes with the formal legal regime.
The jury's ability to turn this sentiment into judgments is limited
by the judge's power to enter judgments notwithstanding the ver-
dict and to order new trials, but the jury still enjoys a significant
discretionary power. Nor need the jury be conscious of this power
to exercise it. One can agree entirely with Harry Kalven's and
Hans Zeisel's careful demonstration that juries do not consciously
substitute a personal sense of justice for the law and yet acknowl-
edge that in a significant number of cases juries bend the formal
legal regime.2
I take no position on the desirability of that power. Lawyers,
perhaps especially law teachers, are often critical about departures
"0 Wolfram, 57 Minn L Rev at 668-705.
61 Id at 671-72.
0" Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (Little, Brown & Co., 1966).
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from the regime of "hard" law. Even those who have made careers
and fortunes presenting cases to juries will always be somewhat
wary of the jury because it is unaccountable and unpredictable. In
such a view the jury is a regrettable experiment in sentimentality
freed from the restraints of accountability. But common sense and
the adjustment of individual equities have equally persuasive de-
fenders. A society that depends on compromise and the blurring of
sharp differences will have use for an institution so well suited to
this function. From this standpoint the jury is the one trustworthy
governmental institution-trustworthy because it has no private
ambition. For present purposes choosing sides is unnecessary. Both
the critic and the advocate can agree that the jury makes a differ-
ence in some cases.
B. The Political Conflict: The Civil Jury and the Structure
of Government
The jury makes a difference in governments as well as in indi-
vidual cases. One can see this feature in the different paths taken
by civil juries in Great Britain and in the United States. In the
United States, where government power is checked in multiple
ways, the civil jury lives. In England, which has entrusted plenary
governmental power to Parliament, the civil jury is a vestigial in-
stitution, a curiosity. One cannot imagine this symposium occur-
ring on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean except, perhaps, at a
gathering of legal historians. Some argue that the American jury
will meet the same fate in time, that only the accident of its en-
shrinement in written constitutions has preserved the civil jury in
the United States.
I believe the matter is more complicated. The persistence of
the civil jury in the United States reflects a distrust of concen-
trated governmental power. The place of American courts in the
political order-checking other branches of government-results
from that suspicion. Within the court system, the jury gives an-
other expression to the same sentiment by dividing power between
judge and jurors. The British, by contrast, have come to terms with
plenary sovereignty. A single legislative branch exercises virtually
complete power, unchecked by courts, which have long been re-
duced to a particularly prestigious branch of the civil service. One
would be surprised to find randomly selected members of the pub-
lic asked to serve as temporary civil servants.
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1. Britain: Parliamentary Sovereignty and the End of the
Civil Jury.
The British civil jury began to die in the latter nineteenth cen-
tury; available only in a narrow category of cases, it presently
clings to life as a possibility rarely employed. 3 Its demise occurred
as Great Britain rebuilt the foundations of its political system so-
that sovereignty rested unmistakably with Parliament (by the
early twentieth century the House of Commons), and political con-
flict was accordingly focused on the legislature. Courts, which had
occasionally played a significant political role in the seventeenth
century, became specialized tribunals for the resolution of specified
conflicts. Judges accordingly came from a professional rather than
a political elite, and they exercised no powers of constitutional re-
view. With the courts' powers thus circumscribed, successive Par-
liaments have regularly reduced the range of cases in which juries
are permitted. Professional preferences have even further limited
the use of the jury within the permissible categories.
In 1800 such a reduction in the courts' influence would have
looked very doubtful. In the preceding century courts had occa-
sionally played significant political roles, and political rhetoric
made those roles appear even more significant than the facts indi-
cated. Within the legal system, the jury had played a particularly
visible role in defying royal power. Responding to these events and
perceptions, legal writers praised the jury. William Blackstone, the
most influential common lawyer since Coke, had published an en-
comium to the civil jury, which he believed "ever has been, and I
trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law,""'
adding that "[iut's [sic] establishment ... and use, in this island, of
what date soever it may be, though for a time greatly impaired and
shaken by the introduction of the Norman trial by battel [sic], was
always so highly esteemed and valued by the people that no con-
quest, no change of goVernment, could ever prevail to abolish it.""
In this praise Blackstone was following Matthew Hale, who in his
posthumously published History of the Common Law66 had de-
voted significant space" and much praise to jury trial, describing it
6' In 1969, there was a total of 25 actions tried to a jury in the High Court; a similar
picture emerges from the County Courts. R.M. Jackson, The Machinery of Justice in Eng-
land 85 (Cambridge University Press, 7th ed 1977).
64 Blackstone, 3 Commentaries *379 (cited in note 23).
"' Id at *350.
"6 Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England (1713; reprinted by
University of Chicago Press, 1971).
" Hale devoted his twelfth and concluding chapter to trial by jury. Id at 160-68.
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as "the best Trial in the World,""8 and "this excellent Order of
Trial by Jury, which is far beyond the Trial by Witnesses accord-
ing to the Proceedings of the Civil Law, and of the Courts of Eq-
uity, both for the Certainty, the Dispatch, and the Cheapness
thereof."69
Hale and Blackstone wrote as apologists for the common law,
but successful apologists (which both were) must strike responsive
chords. Juries were popular institutions among the political classes
of eighteenth-century England in part because they appeared to be
bulwarks against royal power, and in part because they were part
of the common law, which was itself in especially high repute.
When Hale and Blackstone spoke of the common law as the guard-
ian of English liberties, they were using well-worn rhetorical coin-
age. In the political struggles of the previous century, the parlia-
mentary opponents of royal power had on several occasions
invoked the common law to further their political goals."0 Appeals
to common law, especially to common law procedure, were popular
in the seventeenth-century struggles, not because common law con-
tained any particularly Parliamentary or anti-monarchical bias,
but because the common law favored whomever held the trump
card in a political stalemate. The seventeenth-century English
kings regularly proposed practices that would have required some
change in the common law. In so doing they were following in the
steps of the Tudors, who worked great changes in both the com-
mon law and the structure of government. But the Tudors did so
through Parliament, and the seventeenth-century Parliaments
were not about to accede to the Stuarts. In that situation, to ap-
peal to the common law was to argue for the necessity of legislative
change, when legislative change was precisely what the Stuarts
sought to avoid.
The outcome of these fights suggests the discrepancy between
reality and the hopes the Stuarts' opponents placed in common
law. Only in Bushell's Case71 did those resisting the Crown prevail,
" Id at 160.
" Id at 166.
70 The four most significant instances were An Information Against Bates, 145 Eng
Rep 267 (Exch 1606), holding lawful an excise tax on imported currants; Hampden's Case, 3
St Tr 825 (Exch 1637), in which Charles I strained the limits of his power to levy extra-
Parliamentary taxes; Bushell's Case, 124 Eng Rep 1006 (CP 1670), in which a jury refused
to convict a group of Quakers who were almost certainly violating the law; and James II's
efforts to use the writ of quo warranto to revoke the charter of the City of London. Jennifer
Levin, The Charter Controversy in the City of London, 1660-1688, and Its Consequences
(Athlone Press, 1969).
" Bushell's Case, 124 Eng Rep 1006 (CP 1670).
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and then, ironically, only by creating an innovation in the law.72
The meagerness of their success did not, however, discourage the
Stuarts' opponents, who regularly appealed to the common law.73
The appeal offered tantalizing possibilities, not because the com-
mon law had arisen as a guardian of individual liberty and prop-
erty (though they sometimes so portrayed it) but because it had
not. Common law had grown as an extension of royal power, and
one could fairly ask the Crown to accept self-imposed limitations:
estoppel is both a legal and a moral argument.
The common law ultimately failed to provide the Stuarts' ad-
versaries with a barrier to royal power. Troops, not courts, had
played the decisive part in the seventeenth-century revolutions.
But the side using law as a rhetorical bulwark had in- many re-
spects prevailed, a circumstance that partly accounts for Hale's
and Blackstone's praise of the legal system generally and their pae-
ans to the jury in particular. To the Parliamentary victors looking
back at the seventeenth century, the Crown had prevailed too
often, it seemed, because it could powerfully influence judges, who
served at royal pleasure. One response lay in assuring that judges
could be dismissed only for bad behavior. The eighteenth-century
Parliaments had insisted that royally appointed judges should
serve during good behavior to insulate them from royal influence.
Another was to bolster the judiciary by injecting a second, inde-
pendent institution at the point of law application-the jury.
But the very success of those who took these precautions, the
Parliamentarians, in time made them unnecessary. In the nine-
teenth century, Parliament supplanted the monarchy as the un-
questioned seat of power. With the battle over, one could contem-
plate changes in the common law that had previously been
unthinkable. By the middle of the nineteenth century, English
government had undergone a fundamental change. The Reform
Bill of 1832 meant that the House of Commons represented broad
sections of the middle class. Something approximating a responsi-
ble Parliamentary government was emerging, with Prime Ministers
changing with electoral results. Moreover, the initiative lay with
Commons: the Crown and the House of Lords might hope to hold
their own, but it was unthinkable that they would increase their
7 See Mitnick, 32 Am J Legal Hist at 206-07, 222-23 (cited in note 10); Green, Verdict
According to Conscience at 200-64 (cited in note 2).
73 J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English
Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century: A Reissue with a Retrospect (Cambridge
University Press, 1987).
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strength or be the source of change.-Most important, the judiciary
and the common law played no role in this realignment of power.
Though given the protection of lifetime tenure, British judges en-
joyed no constitutional leverage. They expounded the common law
and construed statutes, but only a Parliamentary majority stood
between them and a change in either. Briefly conceivable in the
seventeenth century 7 4 constitutional review had vanished as a ju-
dicial function by the nineteenth.
This shrunken judicial role became evident in late eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century political and social struggles. When En-
glish employers sought to prevent workers from uniting in pursuit
of higher wages, they turned not to the courts but to Parliament,
which obliged with the Combination Acts. 5 When Catholics sought
political emancipation, they waged their struggle in Parliament,
not in courts. The great, defeated social and political movement of
the mid-century, Chartism 7 6 symbolizes this Parliamentary ascen-
dancy: its climax was a gathering outside Parliament to present a
petition carrying more than a million signatures seeking political
change.
Though it rejected the Chartists' petitions, nineteenth-century
Parliament could be moved to legislation without waiting for royal
proposals' It reformed itself in 1832 and 1867, broadening the
franchise to an extent that would have been unimaginable a cen-
tury before. Parliament also sporadically attacked legal procedure,
first hesitantly in the early part of the century, then in a thorough-
going fashion in the Judicature Act of 1873,7 which merged law
and equity, abolished the forms of action, and reorganized the ju-
dicial system-probably the most sweeping change any Anglo-
American legal system has undergone at one time. Formally, the
Act did not affect civil trial by jury, but use of the jury began to
decline dramatically.78 That change was made formal in 1920 in
the Administration of Justice Act, which made jury trial discre-
tionary except in seven enumerated cases.7 9 Thus, civil jury trials
S.E. Thorne, Dr. Bonham's Case, 54 L Quarterly Rev 543 (1938), discusses the most
famous episode, concluding that the theory of constitutional review that later generations
attributed to Sir Edward Coke was not present in the 1610 case to which it was traced.
" The Combination Acts, 39 and 40 Geo III ch 106 (1800).
7' A workingman's social movement, Chartism sought to expand the franchise for Par-
liament and to democratize its members.
7, Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 36 & 37 Vict ch 66 (1873).
" Jackson, The Machinery of Justice at 84 (cited in note 63).
71 10 & 11 Geo V ch 81 (1920). The enumerated causes were fraud, libel, slander, mali-
cious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction or breach of promise.
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had moved in 150 years from the subject of encomia by society's
leading figures to near extinction. Why?
Simply put, Parliament provided a far more effective voice of
popular will than juries. As Parliament achieved power, the politi-
cal significance of the judiciary, the common law and the jury de-
clined. No one looked to courts to control the power of a monarch;
no one looked to juries to check a judiciary too subservient to the
Crown. In the seventeenth century, each tiny gear in common law
procedure had the potential either to break the deadlock or to pro-
long the conflict and thus to favor whichever side held the stakes.
By the nineteenth century the political fights were not about
whether Parliament would have to be called to settle the conflict
but about how Parliament would resolve the question. There is no
inevitability here. British society might have distrusted the new
Parliament as much as it had the old kings. But, because initially
Commons shared power with the Lords and because both believed
in some undefined residual power of the Crown, the concern never
materialized.
Because common law process no longer played a national po-
litical role, it became possible to contemplate changes in proce-
dure. Changes generated no political resistance because no one any
longer thought that the courts themselves represented an impor-
tant political force. The nation had put all its political eggs in the
Parliamentary basket. For good or ill, Parliament would deter-
mine. As a result, when Parliament chose in the wake of World
War I to limit civil juries to a few specified cases, the action
aroused no strong protest.80 Lay participation in deciding civil
cases had no political significance because the courts themselves
were not strong political actors. Across the Atlantic matters devel-
oped quite differently.
2. United States: Divided Power and the Civil Jury.
During the two centuries in which British courts lost any
traces of a political role, courts in the United States were providing
a stage for a rich political theater. Even a partial list of the social
and political issues in which courts played political roles would
closely parallel the history of the society: federal control over the
banking system, slavery, the power of labor, the federal role in reg-
ulating the economy, federal protection of civil rights, the appor-
tionment of seats in state legislatures, capital punishment and
0 A wistful Lord Atkins limited himself to doubting whether Parliament could really
have meant what the words of the act said. Ford v Blurton, 38 TLR 801, 805 (1922).
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abortion. Courts have played a role in these conflicts because state
and federal constitutions give judges a political trump
card-judicial review. The power to render stringently limiting in-
terpretations of legislation and to declare statutes unconstitutional
has played an important role in the history of American society.
Judicial review reflects a distrust of plenary power held by a
single branch of government. The elected branches draw their
powers from their constituencies, but separately elected legislators
and executives result in dispersed power. The unelected federal ju-
diciary can rely on its lifetime tenure (protected by the difficulty of
amending the constitution); state judiciaries can look only to their
powers of persuasion and the polity's distrust of other branches. 1
In spite of these seeming imbalances in power, the judiciary has
proved a formidable counterbalance to executive and legislative
power.
The same distrust of power produced both judicial review and
the jury. If judicial review reflects a distrust of executive and legis-
lative power, juries reflect in turn a distrust of judicial power. This
role for the jury in a politicized judiciary was evident early in the
debate over the federal constitution. Part of the enthusiasm for the
jury resulted from its presumed sympathies with debtors, but jury
trial played a second, deeper, political role:
A related aspect ... concerned the much-discussed issue
of jury trial, which it was alleged the Constitution would
weaken or destroy .... [T]he crux of the objection lay in
the political significance of the jury trial. While an ade-
quate representation in at least one branch of the legisla-
ture was indispensable at the top, law-making level, the
jury trial provided the people's safeguard at the bottom,
administrative level. "Juries are constantly and fre-
quently drawn from the body of the people, and freemen
of the country; and by holding the jury's right to return a
general verdict in all cases sacred, we secure to the peo-
ple at large, their just and rightful controul [sic] in the
judicial department." A [Maryland] Farmer argued, in-
deed, that the jury trial is more important than represen-
tation in the legislature, because "those usurpations,
which silently undermine the spirit of liberty, under the
l Most states require their judges to withstand some sort of electoral testing, but out-
right political contests are rare. The defeat of some state supreme court judges in California
several years ago made national headlines, attesting to the rarity of such electoral uprisings.
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sanctions of law, are more dangerous than direct and
open legislative attacks .... ." The main point, however,
is that the democratic branch of the legislature and the
jury trial are the means of effective and popular control
.... The often extreme and apparently unfounded claims
by the Anti-Federalists that the proposed Constitution
would destroy the trial by jury should be seen against
this background. The question was not fundamentally
whether the lack of adequate provision for jury trial
would weaken a traditional bulwark of individual rights
(although that was also involved) but whether it would
fatally weaken the role of the people in the administra-
tion of government.2
Despite changes in its use and structure, the jury has contin-
ued to play such a role. It continues to influence the formal legal
regime at the point of application. Some would describe the effects
as tempering the law, others as distorting it. But, with the para-
doxical and unintended effects that attend most efforts to use the
jury, the American civil jury has strengthened the judiciary as
much as it has controlled it. The jury supplies an element of citi-
zen participation in the most elite branch of government, shaping
the development of administered law. One can see this role in the
contemporary civil jury's actions in relation to several major com-
mon law bases of liability. The pattern, repeated under different
doctrinal rubrics, is simple: the judiciary tentatively opens the
door to a new pattern of liability by permitting a claim to reach
the jury; juries accept the opportunity; and the insulation given to
jury verdicts results in a legal regime much stronger than that
which judges alone could have created. Several examples fit this
pattern.
In torts, the civil jury has wrought much. It has, with a modest
assist from the courts, rewritten the law of ordinary negligence.
For many years juries simply declined to find contributory negli-
gence when the strictest interpretation of the law might have sug-
gested its presence. The result was a regime of comparative negli-
gence that long preceded the judicial and legislative abolition of
contributory negligence as a defense. Without being too fanciful,
one can compare the change to that which medieval English jurors
worked in the law of homicide. Without flatly ignoring the law, ju-
82 Herbert J. Storing, The Complete Anti-Federalists 18-19 (University of Chicago
Press, 1981), quoting Federal Farmer (XV,2.8.90) and [Maryland] Farmer (IV,5,1,65).
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ries interpreted facts in ways that created a more nuanced applica-
tion of law. For the medieval jury, the nuanced application led to
graded homicide; for the modern jury, the regime was comparative
negligence. Ultimately, law caught up with the jury. Courts and
legislatures formally adopted the system that jury verdicts had
been applying informally for years.
Products liability offers a more complex example. In this area
the jury did not act alone, but once given its head by the judiciary,
jury verdicts created the modern rules of product liability. Early
judicial decisions opened the door by holding that the manufac-
turer was liable to the ultimate user and that the safety of a prod-
uct's design was a question for the jury. 3 Over the last several de-
cades, juries have responded with a string of plaintiffs' verdicts.
That string is not unbroken: defendants win many verdicts. But
the trend is sufficiently persistent and includes enough high ver-
dicts to constitute a new legal regime. 4 Whether one applauds or
deplores the results, they are difficult to imagine without the
jury. The judiciary-even a life-tenure, politically sensitive judi-
ciary 8 -could not have survived the attacks that a string of large
plaintiffs' verdicts would have engendered. But while the defense
bar and its clients may attack juries generally in industry meet-
ings, such a public stance is as unthinkable as an American politi-
cian's campaigning against the wisdom of the electorate. 7 The
jury's egalitarian roots provide a defense against attacks on the
system itself, however much individual verdicts may be attacked.
8 See Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law,
58 NYU L Rev 796, 797-811 (1983), for an account of the evolution of product liability law.
0' One sign of the existence of that regime is work attacking it. See Peter W. Huber,
Liability: The Legal Revolution and its Consequences (Basic Books, 1988).
83 To that extent, attacks on judicial iniquity in creating the law miss part of the pic-
ture: that "law" is as much a product of juries as of judges. One commentator who recog-
nizes the jury's role nevertheless deplores it, arguing that its exercise of discretion in prod-
uct liability cases is inherently "polycentric" and thus inappropriate for a court of law.
James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum L Rev 1531, 1534 (1973). Seen from the perspective
of the jury's history, one might argue that the jury has never fit very comfortably within a
regime of what Max Weber would have called legal rationality. See Max Weber, Max Weber
on Law in Economy and Society 61-64 (Simon & Schuster, 1954).
88 And, of course, the law of products liability was primarily a result of state judiciaries
that do not enjoy life-tenure.
87 The financing of the campaign that resulted in the electoral defeat of Chief Justice
Rose Bird of California is a case in point. Although much of the campaign advertising-and
the public opinion polls-treated it as a referendum on the death penalty, much of the
financing came from industry groups with little interest in such issues: insurance companies
and employer groups. One imagines that conducting a campaign against high product liabil-
ity and wrongful discharge verdicts did not seem to be a likely winning strategy.
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A similar pattern emerges in the law of wrongful discharge. In
several states8" jury verdicts are in the process of creating, slowly
and unevenly, a form of job security that the common law doctrine
of employment-at-will denied. Some non-union workers in the
United States are thus achieving through common law and jury
verdict what their unionized counterparts won in collective bar-
gaining and what their European counterparts got through legisla-
tion. A comparative perspective may help to highlight juries' politi-
cal situation. In many industrialized societies employees enjoy
security against discharge without cause." Their protection came
through legislation. In the United States there has also been popu-
lar participation in the shaping of this new legal regime, but it has
come at the level of law application, through the jury. Again, the
jury's participation in this lawmaking gives it a status closer to leg-
islation than to pure judge-made law.
Punitive damages provide a final example of the political va-
lence-and attendant power to excite controversy-of the contem-
porary civil jury. Available in a variety of tort actions, punitive
damages raise the stakes for defendants found to have engaged in
various behavior, turning any given instance of liability into a po-
tential disaster. 1 Closer to my point, punitive damages explicitly
recognize the quasi-political, lawmaking power of the jury. In de-
ciding punitive damages cases, juries are asked to decide the repre-
hensibility of the defendant's conduct: they are fashioning an ad
hoc criminal statute. A recently rejected challenge to this power of
juries focused on just this aspect of punitive damages. In Browning
Ferris Industries v Kelco, 2 the petitioners argued that the jury's
infliction of a punitive damage award more than one hundred
times the amount of actual damages violated the excessive fines
clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Court rejected the argu-.
ment. In doing so, it remarked that "[h]ere the government of Ver-
88 One handbook lists 38 U.S. jurisdictions that have recognized limitations on the
power of an employer to discharge at will a non-unionized employee. BNA Individual Em-
ployment Rights Manual, 505:51-52 at 145-46 (1989).
88 William B. Gould IV, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbitra-
tion, 13 Empl Rel L J 404, 408-09 (1988).
"0 Some would also say contract, citing such cases as Seaman's Direct Buying Service,
Inc. v Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal 3d 752, 765-66 (1984), in which the California Supreme
Court opened the possibility of punitive damages for "wrongful breach of contract."
81 The degree of disaster will depend on the jury's judgment about the appropriate
amount of punitive liability. Because the jury is asked to consider the defendant's net worth
in assessing the penalty, the stakes are high.
" Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S Ct 2909
(1989).
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mont has not taken a positive step to punish. 9 3 That statement
may be a bit facile. Vermont, after all, was not the only political
body involved in assessing the damages: the federal government (in
whose court system the trial occurred) was acting politically
through the jury in a way that might be thought to trigger the
Amendment.
Again, I do not wish to argue that punitive damages are un-
constitutional, or even unwise. In a society as relatively unregu-
lated as ours, one can make a good argument that the unpredict-
able, after-the-fact inquiry conducted by the jury and backed by a
potentially catastrophic damage award serves a powerfully benefi-
cial function." Instead, I want to focus on the way in which this
power puts the civil jury, like the judicial system of which it is a
part, into the center of the political arena. Civil jury verdicts make
law. Civil juries create changes that the unaided judiciary could
not achieve. That law-making, power-sharing role of the civil jury
has two aspects. First, the existence of the civil jury as a factfind-
ing, law-applying body may encourage judges to make the initial
decision to let a question go to the jury. Judges deciding such
questions know that the jury, not the judiciary, will actually apply
the law. Second, once the jury gets the power to decide such ques-
tions, its temporary existence and insulation from review give it
the freedom to grant awards likely to be higher than those a judge
would give in the same circumstances. The jury need not expose its
calculations of liability or damages to public scrutiny: the "black
box" quality of the general verdict keeps these aspects of its law-
making hidden and less susceptible to criticism.
Because juries have these powers, the protection is not com-
plete, and verdicts draw blame and praise. 5 But the nature of the
jury system, if not of individual juries, provides a shelter against
change. Ordinarily in the United States attacks on government
take the form of attacks on persons: we regularly, perpetually,
throw the rascals out. It is difficult to think of jurors as official
rascals. Juries are not permanent government officials; they are
us-citizens applying law to other citizens. This temporary status
"' Id at 2920.
" Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive
Damages: A Comment, 56 S Cal L Rev 133 (1982).
95 It does not matter, I believe, that much of the blame and praise come from intensely
self-interested parties (for example, the plaintiffs' and defense bars and their clients). In all
political discourse self-interest plays a strong role. It reinforces rather than detracts from
my point that the praisers and blamers may be arguing about their own economic welfare.
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renders them almost immune to criticism.98 As a consequence, any
proposal to eliminate them would prove intensely controversial-as
it was not in Britain, where law reform commissions could dispense
of the matter without great passion. 7 Here, dispersed political
power, combined with the judiciary's portion of that power, render
juries political but, paradoxically, sheltered by their status as rep-
resentatives of the people.
III. THINKING ABOUT THE JURY
Today's jury is a comparatively new institution. The contro-
versy over the jury is ancient, though the jury's present functions
dictate the form of the controversy. Recognizing both these facts
ought to change the shape of the debate about the modern jury.
Neither one, of course, dictates any normative stance toward the
modern jury. Both those who argue for an extension of its egalita-
rian sway and those who view it as an unjustifiably irrational relic
have strong arguments. My thesis does, however, have one strong
implication for the contemporary jury debate: both those who at-
tack and those who defend the modern jury ought to be clear
about the political character of the institution under discussion. It
is perfectly fair to argue that juries are inconsistent, expensive or
unreliable finders of facts. All of those charges may be true. But
one must then go on to face the political implications of this pro-
position: one cannot simply discuss the jury as if it were an en-
tirely utilitarian institution to be judged by how well it performed
a factfinding function. The jury's supporters have a similar burden
to bear. Praising its common sense or noting the extent of its
agreement with the judge will not do: to defend the jury one must
defend a peculiar, unelected and unaccountable political institu-
tion. The debate is about the shape of government as much as it is
about the reconstruction of facts.
90 A modest demonstration of this proposition emerges if one compares the press treat-
ment of grand juries, which typically sit for extended periods of time, with that accorded
trial juries. The former are occasionally excoriated; the latter rarely. Even when thought to
be wrong, trial juries usually draw sympathetic understanding for the difficulty of their job,
not attacks for stupidity or bias.
" When the Secretary of State for Scotland asked a commission to report on jury trial
in that .land, it disposed of its task in about 40 pages, dividing 7-3 with the majority favoring
the continuation of the limited (though little used) opportunity for jury trial and the minor-
ity recommending its complete abolition. Civil Jury Trial in Scotland: A Report by A Com-
mittee Appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland, Great Britain Parliament Papers
by Command, Command no 851 (Edinburgh; Her Majesty's Stationary Office 1959).

